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Abstract
This paper considers two land tenure modes leasehold and freehold and models hous-
ing maintenance incentives under land tenure security in Japan. Compared with freeholders,
leaseholders are equally likely to remain in the premises, but spend less on home mainte-
nance, because leaseholders are not full residual claimants, even under land tenure security.
The empirical results show that maintenance expenditures of leaseholders are about 30%
lower than those of freeholders in the Japanese residential land market. Empirical evidence
also indicates that leaseholders are equally likely to remain in their premises even when they
undermaintain their dwellings.
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I Introduction
Little is known about the relationship between land tenure security and home maintenance in
developed countries. Residential land lease is rare in many developed economies because the
housing unit and the land are usually treated as a single property (Kanemoto, 1990).1 In several
parts of developed economies, however, the land is regarded as a separate asset from the housing
unit, and, consequently, residential land lease is practiced.2 The purpose of this paper is to o¤er
a theoretical model and to empirically test the e¤ect of land tenure security on maintenance
expenditure decision in Japan. The paper also examines removal decisions of lessees under
land tenure security. To shed light on these problems, the paper compares two land tenure
modes leasehold and freehold. Comparing leasehold with freehold shows us whether decisions
of leaseholders are optimal or not, because freeholders achieve optimal decisions.3
Both residential land lease contracts and land tenure security have a variety of forms in
the world. Japan is a country, however, which shares a common feature with many other
countries in the world. Under leasehold, tenants own the home and lease the land beneath it.4
Tenants occupy the land under a tenancy for years.5 They have to return the land and lose the
premises at the expiration of the lease term. It is di¢ cult for landowners to induce responsible
behavior by tenants, because tenants are not residual claimants on housing (Kanemoto, 1990;
Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull, 2001).6 Thus, perceived land tenure security is a precondition
for tenants to invest in housing improvements (Mayo and Angel, 1993; Payne, 2001).7
1See Asabere (1981, 2004), De Souza (1998), Jimenez (1984), Mayo and Angel (1993), and Payne (2001) for
the relation between land tenure system (security) and the property price (investment in housing construction
and improvements) in developing countries.
2For example, see: Blandy and Robinson (2001) and McDonald (1969) on UK, Fry and Mak (1984) and La
Croix, Mak, and Rose (1995) on Hawaii, Hong (1998) on Hong Kong, Janssen (2003) on Stockholm.
3Blandy and Robinson (2001) have indicated that the discourse of property law in England and Wales uses
the formal legal language of freeholder (an occupier holding fee simple absolute in possession) and leaseholder
(an occupier holding term of years absolute).
4The 2006 White Paper on Land and Real Property has stated that there is no equivalent system of leasehold
property ownership, there is a property holding system called residential land lease in Japan. In this paper,
however, leasehold and residential land lease are treated as the same thing.
5This is usually set at more than 50 years, but it is just 30 years in Japan.
6Using option-pricing theory, Capozza and Sick (1991) have found that a ground lessee will redevelop sooner
and at a lower intensity than would a freeholder.
7Dale-Johnson (2001) and Grenadier (2005) have shown that the landowner may structure a lease to induce
responsible behavior by the lessee. For example, if (1) a contract includes a lease extension option; (2) a lessee
has a residual claim; and (3) a ground lease contains strict provisions concerning improvement, then it diminishes
the under(re)development problems of the ground lease.
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Kanemoto (1990), however, has shown that ine¢ cient housing investment may occur if ten-
ants are not allowed to sublease the land freely. On the one hand, if tenants remain in the
dwelling, even after the end of the contractual term, they receive the benets of the dwelling.
On the other hand, if tenants move out, they do not receive the benets of housing investment
because of the prohibition of subleases.
Land tenure security promotes optimal investment if subleasing is allowed (Kanemoto, 1990).
If tenants sublet the dwelling, the sublease rent will reect housing investment. Thus, tenants
fully capture the benets of investment. Leasehold does not di¤er from freehold in this case.
Seshimo (2003), however, has argued that overinvestment is generated by land tenure secu-
rity. In his model, tenants can obtain a compensation of removal when they move out. The
compensation of removal is assumed to be higher than the sublease rent set in Kanemotos
model. Thus, the benets of housing investments by tenants are larger than the rst-best case.
As a result, their housing investments are excessive. Landlords cannot convert the land use as
long as they do not compensate the benets from overinvestment by tenants. Seshimo (2003),
thus, has shown that tenants are more likely to remain in the premises.
In this paper, we consider land tenure security in Japan. Lessees are protected by Japanese
Land Lease Law as follows. First, tenants retain the option to renew their contracts, coupled
with a market ground rent forced on landowners. Second, tenants have a right of claim that
landowners purchase the premises at the market prices when they move.
Freehold is maintained optimally, because freeholders are residual claimants of the premises.
In comparing leasehold with freehold, our model includes both the undermaintenance case that
is similar to Kanemoto (1990) and the over maintenance case that is similar to Seshimo (2003).8
In our model, tenants have a residual claim equivalent to the market price of the improvements
when they relocate. Therefore, they care about housing as freeholders. The problem is that
the amount of payment is decided by the court. The payment may not reect the full benets
of housing maintenance expenditures, because a lawsuit in relation to the payment may be
time-consuming and costly in Japan (Kanemoto, 1997). This problem discourages maintenance
8Kanemoto (1990) has examined both new housing investment and additional home maintenance. In the em-
pirical part of the paper, we can only obtain expenses of home maintenance. Thus, we only examine maintenance
expenditures in the theoretical part of the paper.
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incentives of tenants. On the other hand, tenants retain the option to renew their contracts with
a market land rent. The incentive of tenants for maintenance is distorted towards the benets
for continued use, because they cannot capture the full benets when they move. This problem
induces overmaintenance by tenants. The above suggests that if the undermaintenance problem
outweighs the overmaintenance problem, then undermaintenance occurs, and vice versa. The
mobility of tenants is also considered in the paper. Our results show that there is the case where
tenants are equally (more) likely to remain in the premises even when they undermaintain their
dwellings. Previous studies have not shown this combination.
Using the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand Survey (JHDS) conducted by the Ministry of
Land, Infrastructure, and Transport, we test these theoretical hypotheses empirically. This is
the rst econometric study to analyze the e¤ects of land tenure security on housing maintenance
in Japan using cross-sectional microdata. The JHDS asks households to report maintenance
expenditures made in the previous ve years, 19931998. First, we estimate a maintenance
expenditure equation using the observations on leasehold properties and freehold properties.
The di¤erence between freehold and leasehold captures the e¤ect of land tenure security, because
land tenure security only has an e¤ect on leaseholders. Thus, we use a leasehold dummy variable,
with freehold being the reference tenure mode.
The JHDS also gives data on the physical condition of housing units. Because maintenance
expenditures and the physical condition of housing units might have a positive correlation, the
physical condition might be a proxy for the maintenance expenditure before 1993. Following
Gyourko and Linneman (1990), we estimate whether premises are in good condition. Again, the
leasehold dummy variable captures the e¤ect of land tenure security.
Lastly, the JHDS does ask householders to report whether or not they will move. We estimate
a probit model of householdsbehavior, whether or not they will remain in the premises, with
the leasehold dummy variable.
The empirical results show the following: (i) maintenance expenditures of leaseholders are
lower than those of freeholders, (ii) leasehold premises are less likely to be in a sound condition
than freehold premises, and (iii) leaseholders are equally likely to remain in the premises as
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freeholders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our
theoretical model. The data and empirical model are described in the third section, along with
the empirical results. The nal section summarizes the main conclusions of the paper.
II The Model
Leasehold refers to the right to use a piece of land for a limited period of time. Under leasehold,
a tenant leases land from a landowner and constructs a housing unit on the land. Upon the
termination of a ground lease, the land and all improvements revert to the landowner.
Consider a two-period model. At the beginning of period 1, a landowner and a tenant make
a one-period residential land lease contract. The landlord o¤ers the tenant a xed ground rent
r1, and the tenant accepts the o¤er. These decisions at the beginning of period 1 are given
in our model. We assume that the tenant erects a single housing unit on the plot of land,
and undertakes maintenance during period 1 to mitigate quality deterioration. Let m be the
maintenance expenditures undertaken by the tenant. The tenant derives utility of v1(m), which
can be expressed in pecuniary terms, in period 1. We assume, m has positive e¤ects for the
tenant living in the dwelling but at a decreasing rate. Thus, v1m > 0, and v1mm < 0. The
tenancy terminates at the end of period 1.
We assume that the residual value (the resale price) of the housing unit is p2(m). That is,
m undertaken in period 1 has spillover e¤ects on thehousing value in period 2. Moreover, addi-
tional maintenance expenditures are assumed to be zero in the second period. The maintenance
increases p2(m) at a decreasing rate. Thus, p2m > 0, and p2mm < 0.
The initial tenant benets from the housing value in period 2 if he or she renews the contract.
The tenant derives subjective value of v2 = b(p2(m)), where we assume that v2m = bp2 p2m > 0,
and v2mm = (bp2)
2  (p2m)2 + bp2  p2mm < 0.
The second period land rent r2 is a random variable, and both the landowner and the tenant
know the probability distribution function of rent g(r2)over an interval [0 r2], where 0 < r2.
We normalize the reservation utility level to 0 when the tenant moves to another dwelling in
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period 2. Then, the maximum rent that he or she pays for the dwelling while enjoying a utility
level of at least 0 can be written as v2(m).
Freehold
For the benchmark, we rst consider freehold. Freehold refers to the fact of owning a piece
of land for a period of time that is not limited. Furthermore, no restrictions and limitations are
placed on the right of a freeholder to enjoy the property, lease it to others, or sell it (Brueggeman
and Fisher, 2006). We examine the case where land and the housing unit are owned by a
freeholder who leases both to himself or herself in period 1.
In period 2, the freeholder continue to dwell in his or her housing if v2(m) is greater than or
equal to the opportunity cost of holding property p2(m) + r2. Otherwise, the freeholder sells or
leases the premises with the land.
Sweeney (1974) has shown that the owners of housing units maintain their housing units at
a higher standard because of pride in ownership. That is, an owner values the extra utility from
maintenance more than the market, so the marginal benet of maintenance to an owner exceeds
that of the market. Brueggeman and Fisher (2006) argue that buyers composing the market for
the property are not willing to pay as much for the owners improvements as the current owner.
Following Brueggeman and Fisher (2006) and Sweeney (1974), we assume that:
v2(m) > p2(m);
v2m > p2m:
This assumption ensures the possibility that the freeholder stays in the same premises.
We also assume that:
9r2 2 [0; r2] v2(m) < p2(m) + r2:
This assumption ensures that the freeholder can potentially relocate and sell the dwelling.
The freeholders choice at the beginning of period 2 can be represented as follows:

G(r^2) = Pr[v2(m)  p2(m) + r2] ) remain;
1 G(r^2) = Pr[v2(m) < p2(m) + r2] ) move; (1)
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where G(r2) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of r2. Equation (1) implies that the
freeholder continues to dwell if r2 is less than or equal to r^2, or otherwise he or she resells the
property in period 2. We refer to r^2 as the critical value. From Eq. (1), we have:
r^2 = r^2(m) = v2(m)  p2(m): (2)
Now, we consider the freeholders payo¤. Assume that the freeholder is risk neutral and has
the discount factor, set at unity. Then, from Eq. (1), the payo¤ function can be written as
v1(m) m+
Z r^2
0
v2(m)g(r2)dr2 +
Z r2
r^2
[p2(m) + r2]g(r2)dr2: (3)
The solution to Eq. (3) satises
v1m +G(r^2)v2m + (1 G(r^2))p2m = 1: (4)
The equilibrium input level, mF , can be found by solving Eq. (4), where the subscript F refers
to freehold.9
Leasehold
Next, we consider leasehold. Under a leasehold option, the tenant has to return the land
and lose the premises at the expiry of a terms lease. That is, in residential land lease contracts,
tenants are not residual claimants on housing. For this reason, tenants, unlike freeholders, do
not necessarily care about future asset values, they tend to undermaintain dwellings (Kanemoto,
1990; Miceli, Sirmans, and Turnbull, 2001).
The Land Lease Law in Japan, however, attempts to protect tenants in two ways. First, the
Land Lease Law admits that the tenant has a right of claim that the landowner purchases the
housing unit at the market price. Thus, when the lease is terminated, landowners must settle
the asset price of the housing unit on the rented site. The amount of payment is decided by the
court. Let 1= , where   1, denotes the shadow cost of the payment. For example, a lawsuit
in relation to the payment may be time-consuming and costly (Kanemoto, 1997). Thus, in this
paper, we dene the following:
9The second-order condition for a maximum is assumed to hold throughout the paper.
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Denition 1 When the tenant moves to another dwelling, he or she receives the payment
(1=)p2, where  (  1).
Second, it is almost impossible for a landowner to refuse renewal of a tenancy contract that
expires if the tenant want to continue it. Landowners, however, could encourage evictions by
increasing rents. Thus, to prevent this, judicial precedents from tenancy suits have established
that the rent for an incumbent tenant, called here contract-renewal rent, is not permitted to
exceed the rent, called market rent, of similar newly rented sites. Thus, we dene the following:
Denition 2 The tenant has an option to renew the contract with the contract-renewal rent r2.
Then, the tenants choice at the beginning of period 2 can be presented as follows:
G(~r2) = Pr

v2(m)  r2  1p2(m)
 ) remain;
1 G(~r2) = Pr

v2(m)  r2 < 1p2(m)
 ) move: (5)
The critical value for the contract renewal becomes:
~r2 = ~r2(m;) = v2(m)  1

p2(m): (6)
We now consider the tenants payo¤. As a freeholder, the tenant is risk neutral and has the
discount factor, set at unity. Then, from Eq. (5), the payo¤ function can be written as:
v1(m)  r1  m+
Z ~r2
0
[v2(m)  r2] g(r2)dr2 +
Z r2
~r2
1

p2(m)g(r2)dr2: (7)
The rst-order condition of Eq. (7) is:
v1m +G(~r2)v2m + (1 G(~r2)) 1

p2m = 1: (8)
Dene mL = mL() as the solution to Eq. (8), where the subscript L refers to leasehold.
Comparing the equilibrium maintenance expenditure levels across the tenure mode captures
the e¤ect of land tenure security.
To begin with, consider the case where  = 1. This case implies that the tenant receives the
full return from the dwelling when he or she moves to another dwelling. Comparing Eq. (4)
with Eq. (8) shows that mF = mL under  = 1. The foregoing suggests that the maintenance
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expenditure levels for leasehold and for freehold will be the same. A similar argument has been
made by Kanemoto (1990). He has shown that land tenure security leads to optimal investment
if subleasing is allowed. This is because, if the leaseholder remains in the dwelling in period 2,
he or she receives the benets of dwelling. If the leaseholder sublet the dwelling, the sublease
rent in period 2 would reect the investment. Thus, the leaseholder fully captures the benet
of the investment. In our model, the sublease rent is equal to the payment of the premises
from the landowner to the tenant. Furthermore, comparing Eq. (2) with Eq. (6) shows that
r^2(mF ) = ~r2(mL) under  = 1. Thus G(r^2) = G(~r2), where r^2 = r^2(mF ) and ~r2 = ~r2(mL).
Next consider the case where  > 1.10 On the one hand,  has a negative e¤ect on the
maintenance expenditure, because  lowers the marginal value of housing when the tenant
moves. On the other hand,  has a positive e¤ect on m, because  increases the probability of
contract renewal for given m (see Eq.(2)).
Thus, if the positive e¤ect outweighs the negative e¤ect, then mF < mL. This implies that
the tenant overmaintains the dwelling. Furthermore, comparing Eq. (2) with Eq. (6) shows that
r^2(mF ) < ~r2(mL). Thus, G(r^2) < G(~r2). This implies that the tenant is more likely to remain
in the premises. Seshimo (2003) has shown that the leaseholder overinvests in the premises
to increase the compensation under tenure security. This reduces the opportunity to convert
the use of the land. As a result, the tenant is more likely to remain in the premises. In our
model, the tenant increases the probability of renewal to capture the benet of his or her own
investment. While our model interpretation is di¤erent, we obtain the same result as Seshimo
(2003).
If, however, the negative e¤ect outweighs the positive e¤ect, then mF > mL. That is, the
undermaintenance problem of the leaseholder occurs in this case. This result corresponds to the
case of Kanemoto (1990) where subleasing is not allowed. Moreover, if mF , mL, and  satisfy
the following:
v2(mF )  p2(mF ) = r^2(mF ) R ~r2(mL) =

v2(mL)  1

p2(mL)

:
Then, G(r^2) R G(~r2). The result shows that there is the case where land tenure security deters
10Let evaluate Eq. (8) at mL(). Then, the impact of  on the di¤erence between mF and mL is also found
by di¤erentiating Eq. (8) with respect to  and evaluating the derivative at  = 1.
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a tenant from moving in period 2. A case where leaseholders are less likely to remain in the same
dwelling than freeholders (G(r^2) > G(~r2)) is an intuitive result under mF > mL. Leaseholders
do not want to dwell in the low-quality housing in period 2. An interesting case is G(r^2)  G(~r2)
even under mF > mL. The case where G(r^2) = G(~r2) does not imply that the probability of
remaining is optimal because of mF > mL. As mentioned above, the tenant should renewal the
contract to capture the full benet of his or her own investment. Thus, leaseholders continue to
dwell in the same housing units as freeholders even when mF is less than mL. An extreme case,
in which leaseholders are more likely to remain in the same dwellings than freeholders is where
(G(r^2) < G(~r2)).11
III Empirical Formulation and the Data
If  = 1, both maintenance expenditures and the probability of contract renewal become optimal
under land tenure security. If  is larger than 1, however, land tenure security distorts the
decisions of leaseholders. The new theoretical results in the preceding section indicate that
leaseholders spend less on housing maintenance than freeholders, and are equally (more) likely
to remain in the same dwellings as (than) freeholders under land tenure security. Various
solutions, however, appear according to the functional forms and the value of . Therefore, the
model demonstrates that the impact of land tenure security on housing maintenance and the
choice to stay are an empirical questions. In this section, we investigate the empirical evidence
on these issues.
The maintenance expenditure functions of freehold and leasehold are respectively controlled
by housing and household trait vectors (X) as follows:
mF = mF (X);mL = mL(X; ):
By converting these equations into a single relationship, we may obtain the following mainte-
nance expenditure function:
11For example, assume that the probability distribution function g(r2) is uniform on the interval [0; 2]. Assume
also that v1(m) = m0:5, p2(m) = 0:01m0:5, and v2(m) = 100  p2(m) = m0:5, respectively. Then, from Eq. (4)
we have, mF = 0:447. Thus, G(r^2) = 0:331. Next, we set  = 5. Then, from Eq. (8) we have, mL = 0:445.
Therefore, G(~r2) = 0:333. Accordingly, we have mF > mL and G(r^

2) < G(~r

2).
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M =M(X; ): (9)
It is di¢ cult to obtain the measurement of tenure security variation () from our available data
that are shown below. Land tenure security, however, has e¤ect only on leasehold; the di¤erence
between freehold and leasehold includes the e¤ect of land tenure security. Thus, we rewrite
Eq. (9) asM =M(X;LEASEHOLD), where LEASEHOLD is a dummy variable that takes the
value of one if the unit is leasehold and zero otherwise. Ultimately, the maintenance expenditure
is assumed by the linear regression model:
MAINTENANCE = 1 + 1LEASEHOLD+X1 + "1; (10)
where MAINTENANCE is a vector of maintenance expenditure, 1, 1, and 1 are coe¢ cients,
and "1 is the error term. We estimate Eq. (10) by means of ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression.
We obtain the data for MAINTENANCE from the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand Survey
(JHDS). Conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport every ve
years, the JHDS collects microlevel cross-sectional data on 100,000 households in Japan. The
JHDS does ask households to report maintenance expenditures made in the last ve years 1993
1998. We use only those households that respond to this question. That is, only homeowners
with nonzero maintenance expenditures are included in the sample. Moreover, we limit the
sample to single-family detached owner-occupied housing, because condominiums and apartment
buildings have the potential to create a free-rider problem in the sense that owners have an
incentive to undermaintain common areas.
We also exclude from the sample any data where the tenancy duration is over 30 years to
combine the theoretical model with our empirical model. In Japan, tenants occupy land under
a tenancy for a number of years, in general set at 30. Thus, in the sample of over 30 years
duration, a tenant might have renewed the contract at least once. We consider only tenants who
have not renewed their contracts, because our theoretical model is a forward-looking model.
Screening the data for complete information on the selected variables produced a sample
of 6,115 observations of homeowner expenditures on maintenance. Of these 94.88% (5,802
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dwellings) are freehold, and 5.12% (313 dwellings) are leasehold. Table 1 shows that freeholders
spend on maintenance 229,600 yen, on average, while leaseholders spend 160,080 yen, on average.
Maintenance expenditure before 1993 is zero even if investment actually took place, because
the JHDS is a cross-sectional survey. The JHDS, however, reports the physical condition of
housing units. Because maintenance expenditure and the physical condition of housing units
might have a positive correlation, the physical condition might be proxy for the maintenance
expenditure before 1993. Data on the physical condition of housing units are obtained in the
JHDS in the following three categories: repairs not needed, or slight repairs needed, major
repairs needed, and dilapidated units beyond repair. As in Gyourko and Linneman (1990), we
refer to housing needing no or slight repairs as sound. Then, we dene a dummy variable,
SOUND, that takes the value of one if the unit is in sound condition and zero if the unit needs
major repairs or is dilapidated housing.
Table 1 shows the percentage of sound housing in the sample. Note that 95.93% of freehold
units are in structures reported as sound, while 92.65% of leasehold units are reported as being
in a sound condition.
By dening the dummy variable, SOUND, the following probit specication is estimated:
SOUND = 2 + 2LEASEHOLD+X2 + "2; (11)
where 2, 2, and 2 are probit coe¢ cients, and "2 is the error term.
The probability of remaining in the premises for freehold and leasehold becomes:
G(r^2) = G[r^2fmF (X)g]; G(~r2) = G[~r2fmL(X; )g];
respectively. By converting these equations into a single relationship, we have:
G(R) = GfR(X; )g;
where R is the critical value function. Again, we rewrite it as R = R(X;LEASEHOLD). The
JHDS does ask householders to report whether or not they will move in the future. Thus, we
make REMAIN, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if householders plan to remain
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in the unit and zero otherwise. From Table 1, we nd that 93.9% of freeholders and 94.3% of
leaseholders plan to remain in their units, respectively.
By dening the dummy variable, REMAIN, the following probit specication is estimated:
REMAIN = 3 + 3LEASEHOLD+X3 + "3; (12)
where 3, 3, and 3 are probit coe¢ cients, and "3 is the error term.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in X. We use the size of the
structure (LOT SIZE, site area measured in units of 10 square meters; and ROOM, the number
of rooms), CONSTRUCT. YEAR, the year when the dwelling was built, and the construction
material for housing characteristics. Note that if a house was extended or rebuilt, and if the
new oor space was more than half of the total oor space of the house following extension
or rebuilding, the construction year equates to the extension or rebuilding year in the JHDS.
Construction material is classied into the following four categories: wood, buildings whose main
frames are made of wood (this is the reference group); steel reinforced concrete (SRC), buildings
whose main frames are made of ferroconcrete and steel ferroconcrete; BLOCK, buildings whose
outer walls are made of blocks; and OTHERS. We include as homeowner characteristics the
total annual income before tax earned by all household members (INCOME), the number of
household members (HOUSEHOLD SIZE), the age of the household head (AGE), and the year
of relocation to the present dwelling (MOVE-IN YEAR). CONSTRUCT. YEAR (MOVE-IN
YEAR) are classied into 14 (11) di¤erent categories in the JHDS, from 1 to 14 (1 to 11), i.e.,
from the oldest to the latest. INCOME is classied into nine di¤erent categories in the JHDS,
from 1 (the lowest) to 9 (the highest). We add these in ascending order to the explanatory
variables in Eqs (10), (11) and (12). Three geographical categories are included, comprising 23
Tokyo wards (TOKYO), 12 major cities outside Tokyo (LARGE CITY), and all other areas
(reference).
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IV Empirical Results
The results reported in the second column of Table 3 are for the maintenance expenditure
function. Before discussing the leasehold dummy variable, we briey refer to another control
variable. ROOM and CONSTRUCT. YEAR coe¢ cients have statistically signicant positive
values for maintenance expenditures. Households who dwell in a bigger and a newer unit spend
more on maintenance. The latter result is contrary to our expectations. However, this may
occur because of the denition of the construction year. As discussed, the year of construction
in the JHDS can change following an extensive renovation. Coe¢ cients of INCOME, AGE,
MOVE-IN YEAR have signicant positive coe¢ cients in the maintenance expenditures equation.
High-income households spend more on maintenance. Older householders spend more on home
maintenance. The shorter time a household has occupied its current dwelling, the more it
spends on home maintenance. The variables, TOKYO and LARGE CITY, have signicant
positive impacts on maintenance expenditures.
Important for our argument is the estimated coe¢ cient on LEASEHOLD. The LEASEHOLD
coe¢ cient is a signicant negative value for the maintenance expenditures function. That is,
leaseholders spend 684,040 yen less than freeholders. From Table 1, freeholders spend on main-
tenance 229,600 yen, on average. Therefore, maintenance expenditures of leaseholders are about
30% (684; 040=229; 600 = 0:298) lower than those of freeholders.
The third column in Table 3 presents the empirical results for SOUND (Eq. (11)). AGE,
TOKYO, and LARGE CITY coe¢ cients have di¤erent signs from the empirical results for
Eq. (10), though they are all insignicant. Again, the LEASEHOLD coe¢ cient is signicantly
negative. This implies that leasehold premises are less likely to be in sound condition than
freehold premises. Thus, the LEASEHOLD coe¢ cient is consistent with the empirical results
for the maintenance expenditure function (Eq. (10)).
The fourth column in Table 3 presents the empirical results for REMAIN (Eq. (12)). The
LEASEHOLD coe¢ cient is an insignicant positive value. We cannot nd the extreme case
where leaseholders are more likely to remain in the same dwelling than freeholders. However,
we nd that the probability of remaining in the dwelling for leaseholders is not di¤erent from
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that for freeholders even when undermaintenance problems are present.
V Conclusions
This paper o¤ers a theoretical model and empirical evidence of the e¤ect of land tenure security
on maintenance expenditures in Japan. To do this, the paper compares two land tenure modes
leasehold and freehold. Because freehold achieves the optimal maintenance level, and because
land tenure security has only an e¤ect on leasehold, comparing leasehold with freehold shows
us whether maintenance of a leasehold premises is optimal or not under land tenure security.
The new theoretical ndings are the following combination. First, undermaintenance occurs for
leasehold premises because it is di¢ cult for leaseholders to expect a claim equal to the market
value of the dwellings even under land tenure security. Secondly, leaseholders are equally (more)
likely to remain in the same dwelling to obtain the benet of their own maintenance expenditures,
again because they are not full residual claimants.
Using the 1998 Japanese Housing Demand Survey, the empirical part of the paper indicates
that (i) maintenance expenditures of leaseholders are 30% lower than those of freeholders, (ii)
leasehold premises are less likely to be in a sound condition than freehold premises, and (iii)
leaseholders are equally likely to stay in the same premises as freeholders. The results of (i) and
(ii) suggest that lessees are not full residual claimants although land tenure security laws exist
in Japan. Thus, the empirical estimates are consistent with our new theoretical ndings.
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Table 1
Mean (Frequency) for dependent variables
Number of Obs. MAINTENANCE (10,000 yen) SOUND (%) REMAIN (%)
ALL 6,115 226.03 [231.15] 95.76 93.87
Freehold 5,802 229.60 [234.48] 95.93 93.85
Leasehold 313 160.08 [142.18] 92.65 94.25
Square brackets are Std. Dev.
Table 2
Mean (Frequency/Mode) for independent variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
LEASEHOLD (%) 5.12
LOT SIZE (10 m2) 27.69 20.62
ROOM (#) 5.96 1.50
CONSTRUCT. YEAR 19761990
SRC (%) 8.55
BLOCK (%) 0.31
OTHERS (%) 3.61
INCOME (million yen) 710
HOUSEHOLD SIZE (#) 3.70 2.17
AGE 50.38 11.98
MOVE-IN YEAR 19711975
TOKYO (%) 1.42
LARGE CITY (%) 11.69
Number of Obs. 6,115
Table 3
OLS and Probit coe¢ cients
MAINTENANCE SOUND REMAIN
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
INTERCEPT 419.969 19.861 0.627 0.279 0.284 0.230
LEASEHOLD 68.404 10.317 0.261 0.122 0.044 0.120
LOT SIZE 0.076 0.117 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.001
ROOM 12.265 1.700 0.016 0.022 0.079 0.020
CONSTRUCT. YEAR 22.011 0.958 0.150 0.014 0.058 0.011
SRC 52.620 8.244 0.078 0.136 0.042 0.093
BLOCK 24.017 40.823 0.318 0.447 0.159 0.404
OTHERS 60.019 12.238 0.011 0.213 0.010 0.144
INCOME 20.864 1.382 0.063 0.018 0.056 0.162
HOUSEHOLD SIZE 0.412 1.109 0.0004 0.017 0.002 0.138
AGE 1.062 0.219 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.003
MOVE-IN YEAR 23.049 0.973 0.015 0.014 0.003 0.012
TOKYO 176.817 19.419 0.334 0.233 0.239 0.189
LARGE CITY 55.694 7.167 0.115 0.105 0.128 0.075
Adj. R2 0.414
Pseudo R2 0.132 0.033
Number of Obs. 6,115 6,115 6,115
 indicates signicant at 1%.
 indicates signicant at 5%.
 indicates signicant at 10%.
